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We consider the implications of improving on GATT/WTO tariff negotiations both the 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause and the twin Paretian rules (that negotiations 
leave the trading world on its efficiency locus and each participating country in a 
preferred position).  It is shown that the set of tariff reforms that satisfy both rules (a) 
is always non-empty, (b) might include no reforms that end in world-wide free trade,  
(c) always includes reforms that are incompatible with free trade and (d) might 
include reforms that support a Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving allocation but 
also support other allocations with neither of those characteristics. 
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GATT/WTO tariff negotiations are multilateral and piecemeal, subject to no formal 
rules other than the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause.  In the absence of additional 
rules, it is not possible to say anything definite about the necessary characteristics of 
feasible agreements.  However one does discern an additional informal but widely 
acknowledged objective – that each participating country should on balance benefit 
from any agreement.  Indeed this objective may be detected in the preamble to the 
GATT itself, for there the hope is expressed that the member countries will enter into 
“reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.”  Now by post-Paretian 
convention the wellbeing of a single country is said to increase as the result of an 
agreement if and only if no resident of that country is left worse off and at least one 
resident is left better off.  In the present paper, therefore, our focus is on the 
characteristics of tariff reforms which accommodate both constraints, formal and 
informal, with the latter interpreted in the sense of Pareto and, for that reason, referred 
to as Pareto-improving.  Indeed we go a step farther and require that tariff reforms 
leave the world on its contract locus, in a Pareto-optimal position.  Thus our focus is 
on reforms which satisfy both the MFN rule and the two-edged Paretian rule. 
 
  It will be shown that the two rules restrict the set of feasible reforms, and in 
unexpected directions.  For this purpose it suffices to focus on the familiar case of two 
commodities and two countries.  Specifically, it will be shown that the set of tariff 
reforms which satisfy both the MFN and the Paretian rules 
(a)  is always non-empty; 
(b)  might include no reforms which end in world-wide free trade; 
(c)  always includes reforms which are incompatible with free trade and, in 
particular, always includes reforms which impose negative import duties and/or 
positive export duties; 
(d) might include reforms which support a Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving 
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affirms that there are circumstances in which free trade is ruled out by the two rules.  
Thus the frequently heard remark that the GATT rules are conducive to free trade is 
inaccurate
l .  Conclusion (c) states that, whether or not free trade is attainable, there 
are always available reforms which impose negative import duties and/or positive 
export duties.  Finally, conclusion (d) draws attention to a fundamental obstacle to the 
attainability of particular allocations associated with tariff reform. 
 
  These findings establish a sharp contrast between redistribution attainable by 
means of distorting tariffs and redistribution attainable by non-distorting lumpsum 
Grandmont-McFadden-Grinols (GMG) compensation.  Moreover they carry the 
possibly disturbing implication that an import subsidy and/or an export tax may be 
necessary elements of a pure tariff reform, that is, a tariff reform unaccompanied by 
international transfers.  Finally they generalize the classical gains-from-trade 
proposition, in which the initial tariffs are jointly prohibitive and in which all new 
tariffs are zero; see Kemp and Wan (1972, Theorem 1).  They also generalize a more 
recent gains-from-trade proposition, in which the initial tariffs are jointly prohibitive 
for each country and in which all new tariffs, whether on imports or exports, are non-
negative and jointly prohibitive for no country; see Kemp and Wan (1972, Theorem 
).  However these generalizations are available only in a two-by-two setting; Kemp 
and Wan (2002) have provided a three-by-two example in which propositions (a) and 
(c), and therefore the above generalizations of the two gains-from-trade propositions, 
do not hold. 
1′
 
  Of course, each trading country must accept a particular level of wellbeing and a 
tariff vector which helps support that level.  To that extent, our finding relies on the 
cooperative behaviour of the trading countries.  However even the classical 
proposition relies on each country to cooperate in trading freely or, at least, in 
imposing non-prohibitive tariffs. 
 
  In a well-known earlier contribution, Wolfgang Mayer (1981) studied some of 
the questions posed in the present paper.  In particular he anticipated our conclusions 
(b) and (c).  However Mayer confined himself to the special case in which, in the 
initial pre-reform equilibrium, each country imposes its optimal tariff and in which 
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1.  The basic model 
Consider two pure-exchange economies, the home and the foreign, each with a single 
representative agent.  Possibly, the two commodities differ only in the point in time at 
which they become available; thus international borrowing and lending are 
accommodated.  The home country has an endowment of one unit of commodity 1; 
the foreign country has an endowment of one unit of commodity 2.  The two agents 
share a symmetrical, increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function; for 
example, they might share the function 
α =++ uxy x y 0     α>
where x and y denote the amounts consumed. 
 
  In the unit Edgeworth box of Figure 1, E is the initial endowment point and the 
contract locus coincides with the diagonal joining the home and foreign origins, OH 
and OF.  At all points on the contract locus, the two marginal rates of substitution are 
equal to one. 
 
  The unique free-trade equilibrium is represented by point C, where the two offer 
curves, EH and EF, intersect and where two dashed indifference curves, one for each 
country, are tangential.  The equilibrium world price ratio is equal to one, and each 
country exports half of its endowment, consuming the vector (0.5, 0.5). 
 
  Suppose alternatively that each country imposes a tariff on its imports.  The 
tariffs are non-negative but otherwise arbitrary.  Possibly but not necessarily they 
form a Nash solution to a tariff war; possibly one is optimal, the other zero; possibly 
they are jointly prohibitive.  The tariff-distorted offer curves intersect at point e in the 
“lens” CE formed by the free-trade offer curves. 
 
  If, exceptionally, each tariff is initially imposed at the same rate, e must lie in the 
open segment EC.  In that case both countries benefit from any equi-proportional 
reduction of the two tariffs; in particular, this is so if the tariffs are eliminated in 
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than C can be reached by negotiating a tariff pair one element of which is positive, the 
other negative. 
 
  If, on the other hand, the two tariffs are initially imposed at different rates then it 
is possible that one country will be harmed by a retreat to free trade.  Indeed this 
outcome will emerge if and only if the tariff-distorted point e lies in the interior of 
either of the shaded regions of Figure 1.  If that condition is met, therefore, the two 
countries will not be able to agree on the free-trade outcome without a side payment 
by one country to the other.  However, whether or not e lies in the interior of a shaded 
region, the countries will be able to reach a Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving 
point by negotiating a tariff pair one element of which is positive, the other negative.  
Thus world-wide Pareto-optimality is attainable in a context of positive and negative 
import duties.  In effect, the tariffs are equivalent to the side payment mentioned 
above.  Thus we may add to the familiar roles of tariffs [in raising revenue, in 
redistributing income (Stolper-Samuelson) and in raising national wellbeing 




  These are interesting findings since they suggest that negotiating countries 
should not constrain their negotiations by imposing equi-proportionality, thus ruling 
out import subsidies. Without recourse to import subsidies it is generally impossible 
to achieve a world allocation which is both Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving; in 
particular, it is generally impossible to reach the free-trade point C without harming 
one country. 
 
  The proof of the proposition is straightforward.  Consider any point e in a shaded 
region of Figure 1 and any Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving point P.  At P there 
is a shared marginal rate of substitution (MRS=1) which differs from the terms of 
trade (p2 /p1 ≠1).  Suppose that P can be attained by means of an ordered semi-positive 
(non-negative and non-zero) pair of specific tariffs (t
H,t
F).  Then  




Since the pair of tariffs is semi-positive, however, 
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The analysis has been based on several simplifying assumptions. These can now be 
relaxed.  Thus we have assumed that the two agents share the same symmetrical 
utility function, ensuring that the contract locus coincides with the positively sloped 
diagonal of Figure 1.  The assumption is not necessary. Thus in Figure 2 the 
assumption is abandoned but our conclusion remains intact.  In particular, from any 
point e, whether it is in the shaded or unshaded region of the lens EC, it is possible by 
adopting new tariffs to move to any point P which is Pareto-optimal and Pareto-
preferred to e.  If e lies in the straight segment CD and P coincides with C then the 
new tariffs will be zero; that is, free trade will obtain.  Otherwise, one of the new 
tariffs must be positive, the other negative. 
 
  Nor is it necessary to assume that there is a single agent in each country.  For we 
can interpret the indifference contours of Figures 1 and 2 as Scitovsky community 
indifference contours based on the individual contours of any number of 
heterogeneous agents, with a GMG scheme of lumpsum compensation ensuring that, 
in the general context of tariff-cum-subsidy reform as in the traditional special context 
in which free trade replaces autarky, the economies move to ever-higher Scitovsky 
contours.  Thus point P in Figure 1 or Figure 2 is not only Pareto-optimal and Pareto-
improving in relation to point e but readily implementable by means of GMG 
compensation. 
 
  We have focused on a particular endowment point.  However it is possible to 
accommodate any initial endowment point compatible with autarkic subsistence and, 
by reinterpreting the indifference curves as trade indifference curves, even 
production. 
 
  It is also possible to accommodate initial tariffs that are jointly prohibitive.  We 
need only recall that the free-trade allocation is Pareto-optimal and Pareto-preferred to 
E which, if the tariffs are prohibitive, coincides with e. 
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  We have assumed that the free-trade and tariff-distorted world equilibria are 
unique.  Suppose that this is not so.  In particular, suppose that there are three free-
trade equilibria, as in Figure 3.  If the home country imposes a positive import duty, 
its offer at each terms of trade contracts (perhaps to zero), so that its new tariff-
distorted offer curve OH  lies uniformly “inside” its free-trade offer curve OH.  
Similarly for the foreign country.  Thus, corresponding to each pair of positive tariffs 
there is a pair of tariff-distorted offer curves.  The curves may or may not intersect in 
the interior of the region inside both OH and OF; and, if the curves do intersect, they 
may intersect less than or more than three times.  Now consider any point e which is 
an interior equilibrium for some pair of positive tariffs.  The shaded region of Figure 3 
is associated with the free-trade equilibrium C
′
1, the shaded region of Figure 4 is 
associated with the free-trade equilibrium C2, and the shaded region of Figure 5 is 
associated with the free-trade equilibrium C3.  Evidently the three shaded regions are 
not disjoint; they overlap, so that point e might lie in as many as three shaded regions.  
But, however that may be, our proposition survives:  Given e in a shaded region and 
any Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving point P, there exists a new tariff pair, with 
one member positive, the other negative, that is compatible with world equilibrium at 
P; and, given e in a non-shaded region, there exists a Pareto-optimal and Pareto-
improving free-trade point Cj. 
 
  Of course, the mere adoption of a tariff pair compatible with equilibrium at P 
does not ensure that the world economy will settle at that point.  And the mere 
adoption of free trade does not ensure that the economy will settle at a Pareto-optimal 
and Pareto-improving point Ci ; it might settle at point Cj  ( ji ≠ ) , which is Pareto-
optimal but not Pareto-improving.  In other words, Ci  need not be replicable.   
 
  Finally, it has been assumed that all tariffs are imposed on the imported 
commodity and are initially non-negative.  Neither assumption is logically required; 
they have been adopted for simplicity only.  As the reader may easily verify, the 
initial equilibrium point e may lie in any of the four quarters of Figure 1; and any 
change in the commodity to be taxed by a country will change the sign of the tax. 
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PROPOSITION:  Suppose that each of two economies produces and trades in two 
final goods subject to tariffs on its imported or exported goods.  The tariffs may be 
positive or negative; some, but not all, may be zero; collectively, they may be 
prohibitive.  Given any initial tariff-ridden equilibrium e, there exists a non-empty set 
(e) of feasible allocations which are Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving.  Any 
member  of   is supportable by (i) an (e, -dependent pair of tariffs and (ii) an 
information-parsimonious GMG scheme of lumpsum compensation in each country.  
If  (e) contains the free-trade allocation then that allocation can be supported by 
free trade; all other allocations in  (e) can be supported by pairs of tariffs, each pair 
with one member positive, the other negative. 
Λ




3.  A final remark 
 
We have focussed on several fundamental questions associated with tariff reform.  All 
of the questions have been handled in terms of the conventional two-by-two theory of 
international trade.  The same questions could have been posed in the broader context 
of m countries and n commodities without changing our main conclusions – that a 
free-trade agreement is not generally Pareto-improving and that a Pareto-improving 
and Pareto-optimal outcome generally requires that, in some countries, some imports 
be subsidized or some exports taxed.  However in the broader context there is a new 
possibility – that a Pareto-improving and Pareto-optimal reform is not available.  This 
possibility is discussed in Kemp and Wan (2002). 
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1. The  GATT itself is silent on this question. 
In his illuminating recent paper [Ohyama (2002, page 72], Michihiro Ohyama  
makes the more moderate claim that “the basic rules of the GATT/WTO are 
economically meaningful and useful for creating freer trade.”  However he 
interprets the “reciprocal and mutually advantageous attachments” of the preamble 
to the GATT quite strictly, in terms of mutual tariff reductions that hold relative 
world prices at their initial values.  He points out that, if all tariffs are initially 
positive and remain positive at all stages of the negotiations, such reductions leave 
all negotiating countries better off.  Evidently reductions constrained in this way 
can never yield a Pareto optimum.  We are grateful to Professor Ohyama for his 
clarifying remarks on this point. 
 
2.  In general models, which accommodate any number of countries and any 
number of commodities, tariffs can play a fiscal role only under special 
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